
Lithuania is building a new cybersecurity mechanism that will help organisations become more resilient. This is a welcome step. Various funding models are planned, but for many it is still unclear how it will all work and who will be responsible for what. Experience shows that funding alone is not enough. Without competent people, knowledge and a clear division of work, it will not turn into real security. We live and work in Lithuania ourselves, so we want this mechanism to deliver real value rather than remain a formality. Hence, in this article our CEO Vilius Benetis shares how it can be made into a practical tool.
The first line of defence lies within organisations as they protect their own digital systems and data. It consists of all the technical and administrative cybersecurity measures in use: all the IT and cybersecurity technologies, procedures and the responsible staff who make sure cybersecurity works.
The third line of defence consists of the services provided by the National Cyber Security Centre under the Ministry of National Defence (NCSC). These include coordinating action, investigating and managing incidents, designing and running training, sharing information on threats and vulnerabilities, publishing statistics, and advising organisations while coordinating the work of cybersecurity communities.
In between sits the second line of defence, which is based on cooperation between organisations within a sector. In Lithuania, this layer of cyber defence is only just taking shape.
The NIS2 Directive, under which Lithuania’s Law on Cybersecurity was updated in 2024, identifies 18 sectors in its Annexes I and II. Organisations operating in these sectors must give more attention and effort to strengthening their cyber resilience. So it is natural that the second line of defence would create the most value in these sectors. They are: energy, transport, banking, financial market infrastructure, health, drinking water, waste water, digital infrastructure, ICT service management, public administration, space, postal and courier services, waste management, manufacture and distribution of chemicals, production and distribution of food, manufacturing, digital providers, and research.
Let’s look at it from a company leader’s point of view. NRD Cyber Security puts a great deal of effort into strengthening its cyber resilience and is ISO 27001 certified. Even so, we are attacked too. Fraudsters try to impersonate our management, and colleagues receive all kinds of messages by email and through other channels. So, like every organisation, we essentially need two things:
In a crisis, organisations often feel alone. The Centre of Registers openly admitted this after the data leak it suffered. If crises are a real possibility for everyone, agreements need to be made in advance: who our allies will be, whom we can lean on, and what that support will look like in practice.
The expectation of sectoral efforts to strengthen cyber resilience is that every organisation in the sector becomes more resilient. I see three ways to achieve this:
There are typically two ways of organising such centres:
Lithuania already has working sectoral centres of this kind. Examples are Litnet CERT in the academic sector, which has operated since 1998, and the water sector’s Vandens jėga VJ-CSIRT, which this year became a member of the European cybersecurity community TF-CSIRT. There are also emerging initiatives, with several in the healthcare sector alone. A project led by Kauno klinikos will focus for the next two years mainly on improving vulnerability management in healthcare institutions. The National Health Insurance Fund aims to build and organise SOC capabilities for the sector.
Alongside sectoral organisations, sub-sectoral cybersecurity centres are also being set up. The NCSC encourages public administration bodies to join cybersecurity centres made up of organisations under their ministry or municipality. For example, 10 organisations under the Ministry of Environment have set up a SOC that will provide them with cybersecurity event monitoring. The centre will help participating organisations cooperate in detecting and managing cybersecurity vulnerabilities and incidents. A similar process is under way among institutions under the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport, and among institutions under Vilnius City Municipality.
There will not be a single sectoral resilience architecture in Lithuania. The NCSC wants sectoral cybersecurity organisations to emerge in all eighteen sectors named in the updated Law on Cybersecurity, and in their sub-sectors too. Sectors will differ in their services, members and funding model (pooled contributions, a central budget, or commercially provided services). They will also differ in which specialists they hire: more technologists, or people who build cyber hygiene.
So I would suggest that every leader first answer one question: what does our organisation want from its sector? What knowledge, what help, what support would we need in a crisis? Then talk to others in the sector. If expectations are similar, you can start small by setting up an informal exchange of knowledge within the sector, which can later grow into a sectoral cybersecurity centre.
Lithuania’s efforts to strengthen cyber resilience at national and sectoral level are already being noticed in Europe. This December, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is organising a visit to Lithuania by Central Asian energy professionals, because Lithuania was the first country in the world to regulate cybersecurity in electricity generation. All of this came from joint effort: we met, we talked, it made sense, so we did it.
The second line of defence can become Lithuania’s advantage if we build it ourselves rather than wait for someone to define it for us. That takes an active role and involvement, not a passive one, from institutions and from every organisation alike. We therefore invite you to consider – what does your organisation expect from its sector?
The article was published on 2026 November 17 at https://www.vz.lt/inovacijos/2026/11/17/antroji-gynybos-linija-kam-reikalingas-sektorinis-kibernetinis-saugumas-592838